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Child Neglect Proceedings-A New Focus
ELLEN K. THOMASt
[M]others in the aid to families with dependent children (AFDC)
program receive on the average less than $1 a day for each child.
If we find that the home is inadequate... we remove the child to
the home of a stranger... paying from public funds up to $7 a
day .... If the child is removed to an institution, the institution is
paid up to $14 a day. Finally, if the child becomes emotionally dis-
turbed, payments from public funds may range from $10 to $25 a
day. Thus, the further the child is removed from his family, the
more we are ready to pay for his support:
INTRODUCTION
The bizarre state of affairs described by Judge Polier has been the
subject of surprisingly little direct attack in the courts.2 Recently, how-
ever, in Ramos v. Montgomery, welfare mothers sought to compel
payments to natural parents in the same amount as is paid for care of
children in foster homes. One plaintiff received $48 a month for one
child; in foster care the payment would have been $105. The mothers
alleged that the differential violated federal law in that it tended to
t B.A. 1955, Oberlin College; J.D. 1973, Indiana University School of Law, Bloom-
ington; Member, Indiana Bar. My gratitude and appreciation to the staff of the Na-
tional Juvenile Law Center, St Louis, Mo., are boundless for advice and encouragement,
as well as for research assistance and materials. A portion of this material will appear
in altered form as a chapter in the manual, Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases, scheduled
for publication in 1975 by the National Juvenile Law Center.
I Polier, The Invisible Legal Rights of the Poor, 12 CHILmDREN 215, 218 (1965),
quoted in Kay & Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CA.in. L. REv. 717,
736 n.85 (1966). Any illusions that the expenditures described solve problems for the
child are rapidly dispelled by consideration of the quality of institutional and foster care
frequently provided.
2 Presently pending is Winston v. Scott, Civil No. 72C-1112 (N.D. Ill., filed May 5,
1972) in which plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the state's child neglect statute,
Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4 (1971), including inter alia the factual allegations that
[f ]oster parents receive approximately $120 per month per child . . . along
with clothing, medical and other small incidental allowances. When a child is
placed in an institution such as Sunny Ridge, that institution might receive from
$324 . . . up to $400 or $500 a month. Moreover, the Department of Children
and Family Services employs caseworkers and social workers to assist foster
parents and institutions in caring for its wards. Plaintiffs . . . as parents can-
not receive pecuniary and social work care and assistance from the State of
Illinois in order to rear their children in home environments, but are forced to
hand over their children to the State because they cannot afford to provide the
care and treatment often demanded.
Complaint at 11-12, allegation 23, Winston v. Scott, supra.
2 313 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 1003 (1971).
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break up families and induce placement of children in direct contraven-
tion of the policy of the Social Security Act4 and in violation of the
equal protection clause. In dismissing the complaint, the court observed,
Some children must of necessity be placed in foster homes due
to the financial inability of the parents to provide a suitable home.
If such parents were to receive the same aid per child as foster
parents receive there is no doubt that they could do a better job
in supporting their children. Nevertheless, to give them that
additional aid . . . would result in an overall reduction in money
available for foster home care.5
Despite the court's casual observation that some children must "of
necessity" be placed due to financial inability, the law of no state per-
mits removal of a child from its parents because of poverty alone;
indeed, any statute purporting to allow deprivation of parental custody
on such grounds would be subject to severe constitutional objection.
Juvenile courts have repeatedly said their neglect jurisdiction was not
aimed at poverty.
The welfare of many children might be served by taking them
from their homes and placing them in what officials may consider
a better home. But the Juvenile Court Law was not intended to pro-
vide a procedure to take the children of the poor and give them to the
rich, nor to take the children of the illiterate and give them to the
educated . . . nor to take the children of the weal: and sickly and
give them to the strong and healthy.6
Nevertheless, children doubtless are, in practice, removed from their
homes because the parents are poor. One Assista at Public Defender
assigned to represent parents in at least 90 percent of the 5,022 de-
pendency and neglect cases filed in Cook County, Illinois in 1971 has
testified that while poverty was never alleged in the neglect petitions,
it was the underlying cause in the overwhelming maJority of cases, with
only 5 to 10 percent of proceedings being based on physical abuse.7 She
-42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970).
5 313 F. Supp. at 1183.6 Rinker Appeal, 180 Pa. Super. 143, 148, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (1955).
7 Affidavit of Assistant Public Defender, Cook County, Ill., filed with complaint in
Winston v. Scott, Civil No. 72C-1112 (N.D. Ill., filed May 5, 1972), reported in 6 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REv. 358 (1972).
A useful classification of the types of factual situations giving rise to neglect pro-
ceedings may be found in Sullivan, Child Neglect: The Environmzental Aspects, 29 OHIo
ST. L.J. 85 (1968). He suggests five types of cases: parental nonconformity, parental
failure to supervise, excessive discipline or cruelty, parental immorality, and mentally
disturbed or disturbing behavior on the part of a parent
Each of these poses somewhat different problems. Sullivan refers in the first class
largely to cases involving deviant religious sects; however, the rationale of these cases is
1974]
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further indicated that most people charged were on AFDC or in the
lowest economic bracket, that the conditions complained of as neglect
would not have occurred had there been sufficient funds, that the store
of information available to caseworkers made all the families potential
respondents if they failed to "cooperate" with a caseworker,' and that
findings of neglect were frequently consented to by families desperately
seeking to obtain child welfare or social work services for a child.'
This article surveys the nature and legal status of the various in-
terests involved in child neglect proceedings, 0 the test governing dis-
position, and approaches to some legal bases which might be used at the
dispositional stage to reverse the curious order of priorities reflected
also dearly applicable to deviant lifestyles based on political views, e.g., to children being
raised in communes or group families, or as Black Panthers.
The second class of cases, being based on actions of the child, overlaps with the
jurisdiction of the court over "status delinquency." There is evidence, in fact, that the
decision as to whether proceedings are brought as delinquency ("beyond control," "incor-
rigible," etc.) or neglect, or even brought at all in such cases, may depend on quite arbi-
trary factors such as social and economic class, the person or agency making the initial
referral, available resources, and the "attitude" of the child or parent in responding to
the initial contact. See generally H. JAMES, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE: A NATIONAL SCAN-
DAL 9-10 (paperbound ed. 1971).
The third class deals with the special problem of the "abused" or "battered" child;
the fourth for the most part with parental behavior involving sex, alcohol and drugs;
and the fifth with situations where a parent is, has been, or is about to be committed.
8 Threats of neglect proceedings are a powerful coercive device. One Eastern Ken-
tucky mother was informed by a welfare worker that unless she gave up her participation
in an antistripmine campaign and ceased making speeches in the area that she would be
chargeable with neglecting her children. Phillips, Three Lives in Appalachia, Ms., July
1972, at 99, 105. In another instance, at a sit-in protesting welfare department refusal to
give emergency aid to a mother of two facing eviction, the agency threatened to take
away the children of participating AFDC mothers. Investigators were sent to their
homes in the hope of finding children left unattended. None were, although the mothers
had by then been arrested for trespass. F. P EN & R. CLowARD, REGULATING THE PooR
299 (1971). See also E. JARMEL, PROBLEMS IN THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PooR
21 (1972) ; PivEN & CLOWARD, supra, at 159, 291.
9 It is by no means unusual for parents to agree to a finding of neglect, sometimes
on agency advice, in order to obtain the help of psychiatrists and social workers, only to
find themselves deprived of custody. Winston v. Scott, Civil No. 72C-1112 (N.D. Ill.,
filed May 5, 1972), reported in 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 358 (1972) ; Wesley v. Weaver,
Civil No. 71C-794 (N.D. Ill., flIed ), reported in 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 265
(1971). Disputing parents are also sometimes advised to file neglect petitions against the
custodial parent, with similar results. Weiss, The Poor Kid, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 590, 606
n.69 (1971).
10The neglect jurisdiction is something of a stepchild in juvenile court. Fear of
crime, emphasis upon law and order and general dissatisfaction with the behavior of
young people perhaps have combined to focus public attention on delinquency rather than
on neglected children who tend in any case to be less visible to society at large. Too, the
only cases directly involving juvenile court proceedings which have been considered by
the Supreme Court have dealt with delinquent rather than neglected children. McKever
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) ; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ; I1n re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1966) ; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 531 (1966).
[Vol. 50:60
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in the statistics cited by Judge Polier. Consideration of the adjudicatory
stage is thus entirely omitted and the finding of neglect assumed. 1
THE NATURE AND STATUS OF THE RIGHTS INVOLVED
The scope of parental rights is nowhere exhaustively defined; how-
ever, those rights are frequently (but not exclusively) recognized as
including the right to the care, custody and control of the child, the
right to discipline the child, and the right to control his religious and
moral education. These rights are not to be disturbed by the state so
long as the parent discharges certain obligations to provide for the
child's support, maintain his health, and ensure his education and
welfare.'2
The Constitution does not provide specific protection for the rights
of parents to raise their children without interference from the state.
Nevertheless, parental rights have been constitutionally recognized
in a variety of contexts and on various grounds. 3 Parental rights over
11 The adjudicatory stage in neglect proceedings has received more critical attention
than the dispositional phase. See, e.g., Becker, Due Process al,d Child Protective Pro-
ceedings: State Intervention in Family Relations on Behalf of Neglected Children, 2
CUMBERLAND-SAiiFoRD L. REv. 247 (1971); Elson, Juvenile Courts & Due Process, in
JUSTICE FOR THE CHID 95 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962) ; Comment, Dependent-Neglect Pro-
ceedings: A Case for Procedural Due Process, 9 DuQ. L. R',. 651 (1971). Comment
dealing with the dispositional phase has emphasized expansion of the role of counsel.
See, e.g., Ferster, Courtless, & Snether, The Juvenile Justice !7ystem and the Role of
Counsel, 39 FORDHAm L. REv. 375 (1971) ; Isaacs, The Role of t'se Lawyer in Represent-
ing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REv. 501 (196,) ; Schinitsky, The Role
of the Lawyer in Children's Court, 17 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 10 (1962) ; Treadwell, The
Lawyer in Juvenile Court Dispositional Proceedings: Advocate, Social Worker, or Other-
wise, 16 Juv. CT. JUDGEs J. 109 (1965); Comment, The Attorizny and the Dispositionat
Process, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 644 (1968). This is doubtless a salutary development since,
whether the proceeding is for neglect or delinquency, "it [is] the rare attorney who ha[s]
the resources and training to challenge competently a given dispositional recommenda-
tion . . " Cayton, Relationship of the Probation Officer ani the Defense Attorney
After Gault, 34 FED. PROD. 8, 11 (1970).
12 Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FIAi L.Q. 393, 396 (1970).
1.3 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreire Court found that the
liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment protected the right to marry, establish a home
and bring up children; thus a statute forbidding the teaching of the German language
infringed not only the right of the teacher to practice his occupa.tion, but also the rights
of parents to have their children taught German if they should so desire. In dictum, the
Court considered the practice (endorsed by Plato and others) of removing children from
their homes for training by "official guardians," and concluded:
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius,
their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly dif-
ferent from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed
that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State
without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Id. at 402.
Relying upon Meyer, the Court later struck down an Orego i statute requiring chil-
dren to attend public schools as unduly interfering with the rights of parents to select
private or parochial schools for their children and as lacking a reasonable relation to
1974]
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children, however, are not absolute and are subject to reasonable regu-
lation by the state. Even at common law, the authority of the parent
over the child was limited by the criminal law and was not a life-or-death
power.' The state may intervene for the protection of the child or in
the interest of society. 5
The weapons available to enforce state regulation of the family
include not only the coercive sanctions of the criminal law, but also the
any purpose within the competency of the state. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children ....
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 535.
Where religious matters are concerned, the Court has more recently ruled that the
requirement of school attendance through age sixteen, while furthering a state's legiti-
mate interest in universal education, must yield to the first amendment claims of Amish
parents to free exercise of their religious beliefs which forbid sending their children to
high school. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Family privacy has also found protection as a "penumbral right" emanating from
the Bill of Rights, and in the ninth amendment. While Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) raised the specific issue of the right of married couples to use birth control
devices, the Court spoke broadly of family integrity. Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring,
stated:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that dearly underlie
its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to
marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental
rights specifically protected.
Id. at 495.
Moreover, when a parent's right to his child is called into question, due process re-
quires that he have notice and an opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545 (1965). The state may not dispense with these requirements solely because the
parent in question is an unwed father. The interest to be protected thus arises from the
parental, not the marital, relationship. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
14 Note, The "Parens Patriae" Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of
Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 894 (1966).
15 In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), Mr. justice Rutledge said,
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents . . . . And it is in recognition of this that . . . decisions
have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest ....
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulat-
ing or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not
nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course
of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from com-
pulsory vaccination . . . . The right to practice religion freely does not in-
lude liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or
the latter to ill health or death. . . . The catalogue need not be lengthened.
It is sufficient to show . . . that the state has a wide range of power for limit-
ing parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and
that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience . ...
Id. at 166-67 (footnotes omitted). There is then, in effect, a strong presumption that the
parent is the best custodian for his child.
[Vol. 50:60
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power to remove the child from the custody of parents found to be
unfit and, acting in loco parentis, to delegate parental rights and duties
to others. In Stanley v. Illinois," the Supreme Court distinguished
between two statutory methods by which the State of Illinois might make
children its wards:
In a dependency proceeding it may demonstrate that the children
are wards of the State because they have no surviving parent or
guardian.... In a neglect proceeding it may show that children
should be wards of the State because the present parent(s) or
guardian does not provide suitable care.
17
The exercise of such power is usually justified on the basis of the state's
role as parens patriae, a doctrine which the Court has viewed with some
skepticism in connection with delinquency proceedings. 8
More recent commentary suggests that the historical antecedents
for the juvenile court's power to remove neglected children from their
homes lie not in the ancient equitable power over wardships, but
rather in the authorization of the Elizabethan poor laws for the re-
moval of children from pauper parents by churchwardens and overseers
in order to bind them out as apprentices, and in the generally hostile
administration of public assistance. 9 The thesis that entitlement to
public aid subjects parents to public control" received recent support
from the Supreme Court in Wyman v. James." Mrs. James, an AFDC
recipient, challenged the right of New York authorities to condition
receipt of benefits upon acceptance of home visits in the absence of a
search warrant. A three judge district court upheld the recipient's
claims. A majority of the Supreme Court reversed.' The defendant,
16405 U.S. 645 (1972).17 Id. at 649.
"I The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who -ought to rationalize
the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was
taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power
of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property in-
terests and the person of the child.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966).
10 Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to Juvenilc Court, 23 S.C.L. REv.
205 (1971) ; Rendleman, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Congress' Answer to Illegitimate
Children, 48 J. URBAN L. 89 (1970).
20 Cf. Harrison v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 724, 43 A. 190 (1899).
21400 U.S. 309 (1971).
22400 U.S. 309 (1971), re7/g 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y, 1969). The majority
stressed that:
The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is dependent...
The dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we
relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary
1974]
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the Commissioner of Social Services, had argued that the visits were
required not only for determining eligibility but also to ensure that the
child was receiving proper care in view of the fact that
[t]he AFDC child is peculiarly susceptible to the hazards of life,
to neglect and even abuse, not necessarily for want of love, but
for want of means.... [There] are built-in factors for the creation
of serious physical and emotional problems. Thus, the recently
much discussed problems of child neglect and abuse are inherently
more prevalent in assistance households... 28
The Court did not explicitly rely upon this contention in upholding
the right of the state so to condition benefits. Mrs. James argued that
the visits "would create two classes of parents ... [t]he distinction...
based solely upon the poverty of one class .... ,2" That the children
of the poor constitute the vast majority of persons coming to the atten-
tion of the juvenile court (whether for dependency, neglect or delin-
quency) has been well documented and may at least in part be at-
tributed to the greater degree of official scrutiny to which the lives of
the poor are subjected."5  Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Wyman,
did reach this issue, stating:
[I]t is argued that the home visit is justified to protect dependent
children from "abuse" and "exploitation." These are heinous
crimes, but they are not confined to indigent households. Would the
majority sanction, in the absence of probable cause, compulsory
visits to all American homes for the purpose of discovering child
abuse? Or is this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitu-
tional law that a mother, merely because she is poor, is substantially
more likely to injure or exploit her children? Such a categorical
approach to an entire class of citizens would be dangerously at
odds with the tenets of our democracy.2 6
One commentator has, in this connection, documented the thesis
that there exist two systems of family law, one derived from the civil
courts and one from the Elizabethan poor laws, and that the presumption
in favor of the parents does not exist in the second.17 The result in
to what the mother claims as her rights.
400 U.S. at 318 (emphasis in original).
28 Brief for Appellant at 22, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
24 Brief for Appellees at 10, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
25 Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Ju-
tice, 31 LAw & CoNIrzmp. PRoB. 377 (1966) ; Kay & Philips, Poverty and the Law of
Child Custody, 54 CALiF. L. REv. 717 (1966); Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts,
and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694 (1966) ; Wheeler, Children of the Court: A
Profile of Poverty, 17 CRIME & DELINQuENcY 152 (1971).
28400 U.S. at 341-42.
27See generally ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
[Vol. 50:60
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Wyman would appear to support such a theory.
The Emerging Rights of the Child
Until In re Gault," it was often stated in juvenile proceedings that
the child's right was to the care of his parents and that if the parents did
not provide such care, the state, for benevolent reasons, would do so.
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the as-
sertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but to
custody." He can be made to attorn to his parents, go to school, etc.
If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial func-
tions... the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive
the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the
"custody" to which the child is entitled.29
The question of the child's rights was directly before the Court inas-
much as the original proceedings were based not on allegations of
parental default, but rather on allegations that the child himself had
committed a delinquent act. The Court pointed out the potential for
abuse inherent in the right-to-custody approach, however benevolently
motivated, and stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone.""0
When the interests of children have arisen less directly, they have
received minimal attention. Thus the majority of the Court in Wis-
consin v. Yoder3' thought that since the children were not parties to the
action no rights of theirs were presented by the record. Mr. justice
Douglas, dissenting in part, urged that the actual interests of the chil-
dren be considered.
3 2
Development, and Present Statis (pts. 1, 2), 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 300 (1964), 17 STAN.
L. REv. 614 (1965). See also Rendleman, Parens Patriae: Frcm Chancery to Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971).
-3387 U.S. 1 (1966).
20 Id. at 17.
31 Id. at 13. A caveat was entered that the Court was not considering the impact of
the Constitution on "the totality of the relationship of the juveagle and the state," nor
even the "entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents."' Id.
31406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32Id. at 241. He noted that, while in the past the Court had often discussed "conflicts
between parent and State with little regard for the views of the child," id. at 243,
recent cases made such an approach no longer appropriate becauw.-:
These children are "persons" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. We
have so held over and over again ...
On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should
be entitled to be heard. While the parents, absent dissent, -normally speak for
the entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will
often have decided views.
1974]
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There is no reason why it should be prima facie assumed that
either the state or the parent will necessarily represent the interests of
the child in an adequate manner. Nevertheless, it appears that the
parent is initially presumed to do so; if there is suspicion that he does
not, then the state is assumed to do so. It was on this basis, inter alia,
that the state's benevolent purpose was assumed to override the interest
of the parent in Wyman v. James, 3 without any finding that the
individual child was in need of protective visits. No specific finding
was made as to the needs of the child, who was too young to have
spoken for himself. No guardian ad litem was appointed. In fact, the
Social Services Employees Union, .as amicus curiae, argued on behalf
of the appellees that the visits served no useful purpose either in en-
suring the welfare of the child or in determining eligibility. 4 Since the
Union members were themselves the persons designated by the state to
carry out its benevolent purpose of protecting the child, the Court might
have paid some attention to their views as to whether or not the interests
of the child were being served. It did not do so, but instead rejected
the Union's arguments flatly:
Despite this astonishing description by the union of the lack of
qualification of its own members for the work they are employed to
do, we must assume that the caseworker possesses at least some quali-
fications and some dedication to duty.35
The Court's deference to government "benevolence" seems incompatible
with the approach in Gault and the cases cited by Mr. Justice Douglas
in his dissent in Yoder. 6
Id. at 243-44 (citations omitted). Thus, he would have remanded for inquiry as to
the children's views.
Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it
would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without
canvassing his views. . . . As the child has no other effective forum, it is in
this litigation that his rights should be considered.
Id. at 242.
33400 U.S. 309 (1971). See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.
34 Cf. Brief for the Social Services Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, as Amicus Curiae at 4, 5, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (197.1).
35400 U.S. at 322-23 n.11.
3e Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972). A few lower courts have been
more attentive to the wishes or needs of the child rather than treating a dispute as being
solely between the parent and the state. In Green Appeal, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387
(1972), neglect proceedings were brought to obtain spinal surgery for a sixteen-year-old
boy whose life was not in danger and whose parents objected on religious grounds. The
court did not regard inquiry as limited to the interests of the parent and the state and
thought it would be anomalous to ignore the child in this situation when the preference
of an intelligent child of sufficient maturity is usually considered in custody matters. The
court noted that children of similar age can waive constitutional rights, receive life sen-
tences, and bring personal injury actions against parents; and remanded for an evi-
[Vol. 50:60
CHILD NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS
DISPOSITION OF THE NEGLECTED CHILD: THE "BEST INTEREST"
Where neglect proceedings are based on medical necessity (e.g.,
unwillingness to allow the child to be operated on, to receive a blood
transfusion, etc.) the usual judicial response to a finding of neglect is
to appoint a guardian for the sole purpose of consenting to the per-
formance of the needed care. The state does not normally assume in
such a case that it has the right to remove the child from his parents'
custody in order to turn him over to a government agency. Rather, it
adopts narrow and specific remedial measures designed to correct the
particular problem.
In other classes of neglect cases, however, once the court finds
neglect and assumes jurisdiction, a wide range of dispositional alter-
natives is open which is not necessarily limited to measures designed
to alleviate the home problem. Rather, with few exceptions, courts
dutifully incant that the governing test for disposition in a neglect case
is the "best interest" of the child. The phrase, dErived from divorce
litigation, finds no difficulty of application there, since it involves weigh-
ing two competing home environments offered by separating parents,
one of whose claims must necessarily yield to the other. The state acts
as arbiter between the parties. Neglect proceedings differ in that the
rights of the competing parties are not equal, that the parents have not
voluntarily submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction for deter-
mination of the child's custody, and that the state is now a party to the
proceedings.
Some courts have expressed doubt as to the ix isdom of the "best
interest" test in custody disputes where parties other than competing
parents are involved.17 The argument applies a fortori where the state
is the third party. Thus, a New Jersey court noted ia a dispute between
a parent and the Bureau of Children's Services that it was:
dentiary hearing to determine the child's wishes. Id. at 349-50. Three judges dissenting
thought this an inadequate solution and that the boy, having b .en under the exclusive
control of his parents all his life, could not make an independent decision. Id. at 355.
In In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972), the court found that despite a
juvenile code which seemed to authorize the court to do anyth ng it deemed fit for a
child, the juvenile court was without power to order an abortion for a sixteen-year-old
notwithstanding the fact that the parents of the girl wanted it. The girl had run away
from home to avoid abortion. She and the child's father wished to marry but their
parents had refused permission. The court indicated that in its opinion, statutes giving
juveniles the right to obtain medical advice and treatment in s,.xual and drug matters
without parental consent necessarily implied the converse right of nonconsent.
3 "Opinions written in divorce suits, where the only issue before the court was the
welfare of the children, are not necessarily relevant authority i.3 a custody contest be-




incumbent upon the Bureau... to show more than that it will pro-
vide a better home for the child. It must demonstrate affirmatively
that the child's "best interests" will be substantially prejudiced if he
is permitted to remain with his parent .... Il
This standard is similar to the requirement of the Oklahoma court that
removal must be shown to be "imperative."
To justify the courts in depriving parents of the care and custody
of their own children, the parents' special unfitness must be 'shown
by evidence that is ... sufficient to make it appear that the necessity
for doing so is imperative. And, in attempting to prove the
"special unfitness" referred to, it is not enough to show that the
parents have bad habits of character."9
In addition to the objection that the "best interest" test is inap-
propriate to controversies in which the state is a party, there are several
other criticisms which may be made of the test. First, the test is
improper as being tQo subjective and providing no standards what-
ever for the determination of dispositional issues. Notwithstanding a
finding of neglect, ascertainable objective standards must be developed
as to which conditions justify removal from the home and which do not.
Since appellate courts will normally reverse on this issue solely for
abuse of discretion, it is incumbent upon trial courts to develop and
articulate rational and objective standards. One commentator observes:
Conspicuously lacking in the reports are cases discussing the
proper disposition in neglect cases .... Typically, the dispositional
part of a neglect proceeding drags on for years, with the court en-
gaging in constant reappraisal . . . . Appellate tribunals have
given no guidance to juvenile courts . . . .40
Second, because ascertainable standards are lacking, the "best
interest" test permits the court to award custody of neglected children
by weighing the advantages of competing environments. As a result,
some neglected children may be removed from their homes because of
poverty merely because a "better" home is available, while other
neglected children are allowed to remain in their homes."'
a38Ti re Cope, 106 N.J. Super. 336, 340-41, 255 A.2d 798, 801 (App. Div. 1969).
89 In re Sweet, 317 P.2d 231, 236 (Okla. 1957).40 Glen, Developments in Juvenile and Family Court Law, 17 CwimE & DELINQUENCY
224, 232 (1971).
41 State v. McMaster, 259 Ore. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971). The Oregon Court
was aware of equal protection problems when it refused to sever parental rights despite
a family's transiency, poor housing, poverty and instability (conditions, the court noted,
duplicated in "hundred[s] of thousands of American families"), id. at 303, 486 P.2d at
572. The court refused to terminate the parents' rights when
many thousands of children are being raised under basically the same circum-
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Finally, the routine application of the "best interest" test after
a finding of neglect is at odds with express statutory mandates for
preference in favor of care in the child's own horne 2 Unless the test
is construed to include a presumption that the "best interests" of a
neglected child are served by remaining in his home, the statute in
effect is ignored.
A more satisfactory standard than the "best interest" test should
be developed which would stress, first, evidence that the particular
neglect alleged actually has had some adverse effect on the child and
will continue to do so, and second, that the situation cannot be corrected
by the provision of supportive and rehabilitative services by an agency
or by other community resources. The latter requirement would give
content to the statutory preference for home care; it would also put the
burden on the agency to show why rehabilitative efforts have failed or
have not been made.
THE RIGHT TO REMEDIAL SERVICES
There are several broad sources of support for the proposition
that parents charged with neglect are entitled to remedial and suppor-
tive services designed to ameliorate the conditions constituting neglect
rather than the quasi-punitive response of removing the child.
State Statutes and Policy
The various state statutes as well as the Model Acts include con-
struction clauses in their Juvenile Codes which indicate a decided pref-
erence for the care of children in their own homes. The Standard
Juvenile Court Act is typical.
This Act shall be liberally construed to the end that each child
coming within the jurisdiction of the Court shall receive, prefer-
ably in his own home, the care, guidance, and control that will con-
duce to his welfare . . . . 3
stances as this child. The legislature had in mind conduct ubstantially depart-
ing from the norm and unfortunately for our children the :.\Ic ,aster's conduct
is not such a departure.
Id. at 304, 486 P.2d at 573 (emphasis added). Neither is poverty a sufficient reason to re-
move children from their homes. Rinker Appeal, 180 Pa. Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780
(1955). The "best interest" test is arguably doubly discriminatory in that it permits both
discrimination among parents on the basis of poverty, and discrimination among neg-
lected children on the arbitrary basis of whether or not a "better" home happens to be
available.42 See text accompanying notes 43-59 infra.
4 3 Standard Juvenile Court Act § 1 (National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
6th ed. 1959) (Construction and Purpose of Act).
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In In re Barron,"" Justice Rogosheske found similar language' declara-
tive of the state's policy.
Implicit in the statutes is the policy that whenever possible the
family relationship should be strengthened and preserved ....
When dependency or neglect has been found, the policy of the
statute requires, and the welfare of the child demands, that the
social agencies make a reasonable effort to aid the parent to under-
stand and meet his responsibilities to the child.& "
In addition to strong statutory preferences for home care, the
statutes typically also state that when a child is removed "the Court
shall secure for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to that which
[his parents] should have given him."47  To the extent that the state
fails to provide for facilities meeting statutory standards, the court
may decline to use substandard and inadequate facilities and require
the appropriate agencies to perform their assigned function in providing
social service. There is increasing recognition that placement is not
social service and that it may itself be damaging to a child.
Psychiatric and psychological authority suggests that even with
ideal placement (which is seldom available), separation from the family
41268 Minn. 48, 127 N.W.2d 702 (1964).
45 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221 (1971).
46268 Minn. 48, 53-54, 127 N.W.2d 702, 706 (1964). Accord, State v. Niemi, 284
Minn. 225, 169 N.W.2d 758 (1969). The purpose of the act is to "preserve and strengthen
the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents
only when his welfare or safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safe-
guarded without removal." Thus even where the child has been removed, the statutory
purpose is that he be returned. The statute contemplates that efforts to rehabilitate are
the responsibility of the specialized agencies. Id. at 229, 169 N.W.2d at 760-61; O'Beirne
v. State, 194 Ore. 389, 241 P.2d 874 (1952) (where child is neglected, the statute re-
quires suitable efforts "to compel such parents . . . to rectify such neglect .... ") ;
In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Farn. Ct. N.Y. County 1969): termina-
tion proceedings dismissed on grounds agency had not made diligent efforts to encourage
and strengthen the family as explicitly required by statute, rev'd, 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318
N.Y.S.2d 876 (Fam. Ct N.Y. County 1970), on ground that the agency had complied;
In re State ex rel. Thaxton, 220 So. 2d 184 (La. Ct. App. 1969) : where the court had
removed the children,
permanent custody of these children is not forever barred to respondent. They
have been placed with the Department for their own protection and also for the
purpose of enabling the Department to work with the mother to the end that
she and her children may be reunited.
Id. at. 188. In re Guardianship of B.C.H., 108 N.J. Super. 531, 537, 262 A.2d 4, 7 (1970)
(statute to be administered strictly in accordance with the general principle that preser-
vation and strengthening of family life is a matter of legislative concern). Cf. MASS.
GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 1 (1969) declaring as policy: the strengthening and encouragement
of family life for the protection and care of children; to assist and encourage the use by
any family of all available resources to this end.




is itself sufficiently traumatic to be justified only under the most extreme
of conditions. Given the extraordinary attachment of children even to
unsatisfactory parents, agencies should bear a heavy burden in justifying
a separation which, as one authority notes, a child experiences as "the
ultimate in rejection" which "crystallizes feelings of inferiority."'
Rehabilitation services are thus more in accord with social work
theories."
The statutory argument is not foreclosed even where the case in-
volves outright abuse, at least in those states where the Child Abuse Re-
porting Laws contain intent clauses defining the intent in terms of pro-
viding social services rather than involving law enforcement mechanisms.
Even in those states without intent clauses in the statutes, the argument
may be made that such intent is evidenced by their designating agencies,
rather than law enforcement officials, to receive reports."0
48 Glickman, Treatment of the Child and His Family After Placement, 28 Soc. SEav.
RE. 279 (1954). See also J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GI:owTH oF LOVE (1953);
A. FRau & D. BURLINGHAM, WAR AND CHILDREN (1941).
-4 Cf. Lewis, Foster-Family Care: Has It Fulfilled Its Promise?, 355 ANNALs 31,
33 (1964).
5oTable 1 shows the pattern of reporting in states having a declaration of intent,
while Table 2 shows the pattern in states without such declaration.
Table 1
Purpose State Report to:
"to invoke protective social Florida Juvenile Court
services" Georgia Protective service agency, if none,
to police
Idaho State Depar-tment of Welfare
Maine State Department of Welfare
Rhode Island Department of Social Welfare
Tennessee Juvenile Court
New Mexico District Atorney
Washington Law Enfor:ement Agency
Colorado Law Enfoccement Agency and
County Dep't of Welfare
Utah Law Enforcement Agency and
State Dep't of Wrelfare
"to cause the protective serv- New Hampshire Bureau of Child Welfare
ices of the State-to protect Vermont Department of Social Welfare
the health and welfare-pre- Indiana County Dep't of Welfare or law
vent further abuse." enforcement
Kentucky Oral to police, written to State
Child Welfare
Arkansas Police Authority
"to provide for protection of Iowa County Dep'artment of Welfare,
children who may be further















Public child protective agency, pub-
lic welfare official, sheriff, Coun-
ty Attorney, police







Implied Purpose State Report to:
To invoke protective social Alaska Dep't of Welfare, if none, to police
services Illinois State Department of Welfare
Massachusetts State Department of Welfare
North Dakota Director, Division of Child Wel-
fare-emergency to Juvenile Com-
missioner or State's Attorney
New York SPCC or Dep't of Public Welfare
North Carolina County Director of Welfare
Wyoming County Dep't of Welfare
Pennsylvania Judge, Juv. Court or child protec-
tive service
South Carolina Juvenile Court (proper authority
with jurisdiction over minors)
South Dakota Judge of the County Court
Ohio Municipal or county peace officer
Wisconsin County Dep't of Welfare or sheriff
May invoke protective social Alabama Police, sheriff or nearest child pro-
services, if reporter chooses, or tective agency
law enforcement Connecticut Commissioner of Health, Commis-
sioner of Welfare, local police,
state police
Michigan Prosecuting Attorney, County
Dep't of Welfare, state office of
State Dep't of Welfare
Texas Juvenile Court, Court Attorney,
law enforcement, county proba-
tion officer
Invoke law enforcement ma- Arizona Municipal or county peace officer
chinery California Head of police, sheriff or District
Attorney
Louisiana Municipal police or nearest law en-
forcement
Maryland City or county police, state police




Children's Division, The American Humane Ass'n,
Reporting Laws, 22, 25 (Denver, Colo. 1966).
Child Abuse Legislation, Analysis of
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Federal Statutes and Policy
In addition to the state statutory preferences for rehabilitating
inadequate families, the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act"
have given strong emphasis to the importance of providing essential
services to families with dependent children in order to maintain and-
strengthen family life. 2
These provisions indicate a clear commitment to the rights of each
AFDC child and his relative to needed services and to the eventual de-
velopment of services to all children. States wishing to receive maximum
reimbursement under the plan must develop additional services and
better methods of organizing and delivering them as well as make a
showing that they are
extending the provision of child-welfare services in the State,
with priority being given to communities with the greatest need
* .. with a view to making available by July 1, 1975, in all political
subdivisions of the State, for all children in need thereof, child wel-
fare services .... 13
"42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970) (particularly the 1962 and 1967 amendments cited in
notes 53 and 54 infra).
5242 U.S.C. § 602(a) (14) (1970) (emphasis added). This subsection requires par-
ticipating states to provide
for the development and application of a program for such family services, as
defined in section 606(d) . . . and child-welfare services, as defined in section
625 . . . for each child and relative who receives aid to families with dependent
children . . . as may be necessary . . . in order to maintain and strengthen
family life ....
The "family services" referred to are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 606(d) (1970) as "services
to a family or any member thereof for the purpose of preserving, rehabilitating, reunit-
ing, or strengthening the family .... " The "child welfare services" are defined in
42 U.S.C. § 625 (1970) as
public social services which supplement, or substitute for, parental care and su-
pervision for the purpose of (1) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the
solution of problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or
delinquency of children . . . . (4) otherwise protecting and promoting the
welfare of children, including the strengthening of their own homes where pos-
sible ....
r342 U.S.C. § 622(a) (2) (1970).
While 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1) (1970) makes provision for payments on behalf
of otherwise eligible children in foster care or institutions as a result of judicial deter-
mination "to the effect that continuation [in the home] would be contrary to the welfare
of such child," the section also requires
development of a plan for each such child (including periodic review of the
necessity for the child's being in a foster family home or child-care institution)
to assure that he receives proper care and that services are provided which are
designed to improve the conditions in the home from which he was removed ....
42 U.S.C. § 608(f) (1970) (emphasis added). It does not appear that the designation of
children in foster care or institutions for whom payments may be made was intended to
alter the substantive state law regarding removal of children. 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1970)
specifically states that funds shall not be withheld from states denying aid pursuant to a
state statute to a family because of unsuitable home conditions as long as "provision is
1974]
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The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has promulgated
rules and guidelines for use by state agencies" with which they must
comply. AFDC recipients are to be referred to juvenile courts under the
same criteria as nonrecipients," and the agency must continue efforts
to improve the home even after removal of the child.5"
Additionally, HEW has issued a pamphlet for state agency use
which discusses criteria and standards for dealing with neglect. It notes
that
throughout the nation there is increasing concern about the num-
ber of children separated from their families, many by court action.
Too often these separations occur before parents have had any
reasonable opportunity to make use of social services or other com-
munity resources to help them solve their problems. In many
communities, especially in urban areas, the resources for sound
placement of children are quite insufficient to meet the steady de-
tnand. This very fact ought to stimulate renewed effort to pre-
serve family homes and spare children the risks and burdens of
living separately from their own families. 7
Federal law and regulations thus compel the conclusion that the statu-
tory policy favors continued home placement with supportive services
being provided."
Constitutional Rights
A considerable literature has been generated in recent years deal-
ing with the constitutional "right to treatment."59 Originally, the con-
otherwise made pursuant to a State statute for adequate care and assistance with respect
to such child."
5445 C.F.R. § 220 (1973).
55 45 C.F.R § 220.23(b) (1973).
5845 C.F.R. § 220.19(d) (1973).
57 Hancock, Children of Neglect 2 (1967).
58 Implementation of the policy has been slow. California responded with the pas-
sage of a Child Protective Services Act, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 16500-11 (West
1972) which calls for welfare administered homemaker services, day care mental health,
counselling and other rehabilitative services, and for a break with the practice of dealing
with neglected children through the coercive institutions of juvenile court and probation.
See Note, Observations on the Establishment of a Child Protective Services System in
California, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 1129 (1969).
Michigan has been the subject of a petition for conformity hearings with respect to
the provision of child welfare services. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Michi-
gan, Petition Before the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Washington, D.C., for Proceedings to Assure Compliance by the State of Michigan with
the Social Security Act (filed Mar. 23, 1972).
59 See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHL L. REv. 742
(1969) ; Birnbaunm, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960) ; Cohen, The Rights
of the Civilly and Criminally Incarcerated, 4 CLEAMNGHOUSE REV. 399 (1971) ; Cooley,
Court Control over Treatment of Juvenile Offenders, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 613 (1971) ; Faust,
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cept was applied to the mental health field;60 however, it has been ex-
tended to other areas of noncriminal custody as well."' It has variously
found support under the rationale of due process,' 2 equal protection,63
and the eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment."4
The basic premise of the theory is that, since noncriminal confinement
can be justified only by the provision of treatment, where adequate
treatment is not provided the authority for state intervention is vitiated
and the state may not restrain the individual. 5
Application of the theory in juvenile law has focused thus far on
children in an institutional setting. Such an approach is unnecessarily
grudging. Attacks on the conditions of confinement, however desirable,
emphasize the negative, rather than the positive, ini that they establish
only the minimal standard which may be tolerated rather than attempt-
ing to give shape and content to an affirmative right. Moreover, with
respect to the neglected child, the focus is misplaced since the conditions
and acts relied upon for a finding of neglect are not conditions and acts
attributable to handicaps on the part of the child. Unlike the mentally
ill or the delinquent, the neglected child is not himself the source of the
problem. Indeed, if the right to treatment means a right to treatment
Implementing the Juvenile's Right to Treatment, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 256 (1972);
Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 755
(1969) ; Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of 2he Juvenile Process?, 57
GEo. L.J. 848 (1969); Malmquist, The Delinquent and the Insaze: Right and Adequacy
of Treatment, 40 Am. J. ORTHOPSyCHIATRY 388 (1970); Penegar, The Emerging "Right
to Treatment"--Elaborating the Processes of Decision in Sanctioning Systems of the
Criminal Law, 44 DEN. L.J. 163 (1967) ; Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treat-
ment, 6 FAMi. L.Q. 279 (1972); Note, The Courts, the Constitution and Juvenile Institu-
tional Reform, 52 BosToN U.L. REv. 33 (1972); Note, Involuntc'ry Civil Commitment-
A Constitutional Right to Treatment, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 125 (1972); Note, The Nas-
cent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967); Note, Cizil Restraint, Mental Ill-
wess, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
6O Commentators in general agree that the seminal article in the area was Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
61 See articles and notes cited note 59 supra.
02 %,att v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
3 Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater St. Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d
908 (1968).
64 Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). It has additionally been
suggested that the ninth amendment may provide support for the right although no case
appears to have relied upon this rationale. Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treat-
inent, 6 FAM. L.Q. 279, 315-18 (1972).613Judge Ketcham terms this the "mutual compact" theory of parens patriae. The
relationship between the state and the child and parent is such that the family forfeits
certain rights in exchange for care and treatment enhancing the welfare of the child. If
such care is not forthcoming, or if the state substitutes governmental for parental neg-
lect, the state no longer has moral or legal justification for asserting control and parent
and child should consider the agreement broken. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of




adapted to correcting the conditions complained of, it would seem that
the right in a neglect case is necessarily one belonging to the family
as a whole; that is, to say, a right to obtain rehabilitation and supportive
services designed to alleviate the problem.
Professor Gough has suggested a similar approach with respect to
the child who is adjudicated as being beyond the control of his parents 6
He argues, first, that in view of the growing evidence that therapy in
family disruption cases must be oriented to the family as a whole, a
beyond-control child may have the "right not to be removed from that
setting in which the corrective therapy must be carried out-the
family. '8 7 Additionally, and most pertinent to the neglect situation, he
suggests that the effectuation of the right to treatment of a beyond-
control child logically extends to treatment outside of confinement as
well as in it.
If there is a legally enforceable right to psychiatric treatment when
the state has authoritatively intervened in the life of a mentally
ill adult, there ought by parity of reasoning to be a legally enforce-
able right to effective casework services and the attention of a
competent worker with a reasonable caseload when it assumes
jurisdiction over an unruly child. 8
It does not appear that any cases have challenged the adequacy of
casework or probation services on constitutional grounds.
Avenues to Reform
Courts have varied in their willingness to undertake a supervisory
role after a child has been adjudicated neglected. As the concept of a
right to treatment becomes better established, however, it would appear
inevitable that the courts will become more willing to accept the con-
comitant duty of ensuring that whenever an individual is in the custody
of the state, that custody must meet certain minimal standards. The
doctrinal basis for such a requirement already exists.
While an occasional court has reacted sua sponte to what it has
regarded as inadequate performance by a social welfare agency,69 the
16 The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Syn-
thesis of Paradox, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 182 (1971). The "beyond-control" child is
variously termed "incorrigible," a "wayward minor," or a "person in need of supervision"
(PINS). The term refers to a child who has come to the attention of the court because
of acts of his own (hence not a "neglected" child) but whose acts would not constitute
a crime if done by an adult (hence not a "delinquent!' child).
671d. at 195.
" Id. at 196.
69 In Chandler v. State, 230 Ore. 452, 370 P.2d 626 (1962) the Oregon Supreme
Court, for instance, stated,
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burden of bringing postdispositional developments to the attention of
the courts remains that of the practicing bar. There are a number of
procedural devices in addition to habeas corpus proceedings by which
this may be accomplished. Motions to stay, modify, set aside, or vacate
orders are available, as are petitions for rehearing. Conditions of
custody may also be raised in independent proceedings for declaratory
and injunctive relief in federal or state courts70 Neglect petitions
may be filed, in an appropriate case, against welfare departments or com-
missioners of social services.' Neither should the possibility of money
We have been concerned, if not shocked, by the showing in ihis record that those
people in the Welfare Department who have been responsible for this girl had
not made the slightest effort at any time to . . . attempt any adjustment which
may be necessary to successfully return this girl to her bome. . . . For all
that appears in the record, it is the intent of the Welfare Department to keep
this girl away from her home until she reaches maturity.
Id. at 459, 370 P.2d at 630. In remanding the case for another hearing below, the su-
preme court instructed the trial court to
particularly inquire as to any effort being made to satisfactorily return the girl
to her home. If it develops that no attempt has yet been m-de, the court should,
by appropriate order, require it.
Id. at 460, 370 P.2d at 630 (emphasis added).
701n Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1(72) such technique was
employed successfully on behalf of boys and girls adjudicated in need of supervision and
confined in state institutions. The suit was-brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) alleg-
ing denial of the constitutional right of persons held in noncriminal custody to "effective
treatment." In examining whether the institutions met the requirements, Judge Lasker
relied on the analysis of Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. App. 1966) providing that
continued failure to provide suitable adequate treatment cannot be justified by
lack of staff or facilities, since, as the Supreme Court stated in Watson v. City
of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 . . . (1963), "The rights here asserted are . . .
present rights . . . . and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason,
they are to be promptly fulfilled."
349 F. Supp. at 601 (emphasis in original).
Because of the novelty and delicacy of the issues, the cou,'t instructed the parties
to prepare for a conference before determination of the full scope and content of injunc-
tive relief. However, with respect to one facility, the court found conditions so squalid
and the facility so outdated as to require, pursuant to the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and inhuman punishment, that the center be permanently closed.
Similarly, in D.C. Family Welfare Rights Org. v. Thompson, Civil No. 71-1150-j
(Family Division, D.C. Super. Ct, June 18, 1971) (unpublished opinion), the organiza-
tion sought as a class to remove neglected children from a state home, to obtain a declara-
tion that it was not an acceptable home substitute, and to enjoin further placements there.
They alleged, inter elia,
[T]hat the staff . . . has proved itself. . . to be incompetent to provide a
safe, sanitary, and healthy home substitute . . . thereby xiolating Petitioner's
constitutional, statutory and contractual rights . . . . [T]hat . . . conditions
have long been known, or should have been known to the re ,.ponsible officials of
the S.S.A. but that no significant action has been taken to correct the condi-
tions . . . . despite this knowledge. Accordingly, it is claimed that SSA has
failed to provide Petitioners and their class with adequate care, custody and dis-
cipline, and has caused these children to endure unnecessary suffering that may
result in permanent physical and emotional injury to them.
D.C. Family Welfare Rights Org. v. Thompson, supra, at 4.
71 In In re R., 61 Misc. 2d 20, 304 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1969), three
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damages be overlooked as a potent weapon by which an agency may be
coerced into better performance72 or into a consent decree. " Finally,
the right to appropriate treatment may be raised in a defensive as well
as an affirmative posture, in response to a neglect petition.'
petitions were filed against the New York Commissioner of Social Services alleging neg-
lect in that he failed to provide adequate food, shelter and school clothing to the children
of the petitioning families. The Commissioner is required by law to provide for those
unable to provide for themselves, including, but not limited to, children adjudicated neg-
lected. Relief was denied on jurisdictional grounds because the court determined that
the legislation setting up the Family Court did not contemplate that the Commissioner be
amenable to suit in the Juvenile Court for child neglect. Thus the merits were not
reached. On similar jurisdictional grounds, petitions were "most regretfully" dismissed
in an action filed by the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children against the New
York State Department of Mental Hygiene and others alleging state neglect of retarded
children at Willowbrook State School. In re D., 70 Misc. 2d 953, 335 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Fam.
Ct. Richmond County 1972). Despite the dismissal of this case, its filing had considerable
impact. Judge Cory noted in his opinion that, while the court lacked jurisdiction to pro-
vide a remedy, it could
not help but express its feelings regarding the horrible conditions at Willow-
brook ....
Such conditions are a blot on the conscience of New York State. The
shocking apathy of the public was rudely awakened by the newspaper and other
media, spotlighting the dreadful conditions at Willowbrook where the most help-
less and defenseless of our citizens were left living "on a thread of life, human
vegetables rotting in inadequate warehouses . . . .
Id. at 963, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 649. After the dismissal of this case, a class action suit was
subsequently brought in federal court on constitutional grounds, New York St. Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
72 In Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970), for
instance, the minor plaintiff sought damages against the defendant county and its Depart-
ments of Social Welfare and Probation. She had been placed in a foster home where
she was beaten and mistreated. The trial court sustained a demurrer to her complaint on
the ground that acts or omissions of public employees in placing children were discre-
tionary acts and thus immune from suit. On appeal, the court stated that prior decisions
made it clear that only basic policy decisions, as opposed to subsequent ministerial acts in
carrying out those decisions, were protected and that both counts stated a good cause of
action against the county. Ccunt one was for general negligence in placement; count two
had alleged failure to enforce specific regulations governing dependent children and foster
home licensing which had been enacted by the State Department of Public Welfare.
73 In Frederick ex rel. Skiver v. Sipprell (N.Y. Sup. Ct, Erie County, settled Mar.
3, 1972), reported in 6 CLEAMINGHOUSE REv. 283-84 (1972) a 13-year-old neglected child
who had been in the legal custody of the Commissioner of Social Services for five years
filed suit against the Commissioner and other state officials alleging that he was receiving
inadequate treatment, that placement in eight separate foster homes in two years had
aggravated his emotional and behavioral problems, and that each of the respondents
arbitrarily and capriciously failed or refused to provide or arrange for the provision of
essential care, treatment and mental health services for him. Id. Verified Petition. The
court issued a show cause order directing the respondents to submit within fifteen days a
temporary plan for Skiver's care, and within sixty days, a five year plan. The suit was
subsequently discontinued upon a memorandum of understanding and stipulation by the
parties to a five year plan, but without prejudice to Shiver's right to initiate new action
in the event of breakdown of the plan. Id. Stipulation of Discontinuance.
74 The issue is squarely posed in a recent California appeal. Mrs. Quinonez, a mildly
retarded mother of five, was deprived of her children when it was found that two of
them suffered from malnutrition. At no time had her caseworker offered nutritional
counselling, explained the use of food stamps, provided a homemaker, or attempted to
[Vol. 50:60
CHILD NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS
These legal strategies can hasten the development of judicial concern
with postdispositional problems only when employed in the context of
the particular case. Here the attitudes of the practicing bar are most
significant. So long as such matters remain the virtually exclusive
province of overworked legal services organizations, fulfillment of the
promise seems quite distant. What is needed is a willingness of the
entire bar to work for such long overdue changes.
determine whether or not Mrs. Quinonez was aware of the problem. On appeal, she
pointed out
the obligation of the State, through one of its social agencics, to furnish a parent
with the support she requires so that she may learn how to function as an ac-
ceptable parent within the norms imposed by our society. Most directly, the
question posed here is whether a juvenile Court may prcperly declare such a
parent's five children "dependent children of the Court" ard remove them from
a parent's custody when there is every reason to believe that protective services,
if offered, would have been speedily accepted by -the molher and would have
enabled her to function in an effective and thoroughly acccptable manner.
Brief for Appellant at 5, People v. Quinonez, Civil Misc. No. 72-13 (Cal. Ct App., filed
June 9, 1972). Mrs. Quinonez alleges that the removal of her children without initially
attempting to correct the situation violates her rights under the ninth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 23.
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